Every year, the democracy index from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) is published—arguably The Economist’s strongest single international reference. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2025 will also be widely cited by media around the world, often without further discussion. When the numbers are released, they appear objective, precise, and authoritative. Democracies are ranked, compared, and graded—as if democratic quality could be measured with the same precision as economic growth or inflation.
The EIU Democracy Index 2025 will be published soon. Before it is released, it is therefore worth asking a fundamental question: Can we really trust this index?
In recent years, Norway has been awarded a score of 9.81 out of 10—twice in a row. In practice, this represents a near-perfect democracy. A democratic paradise, with only marginal shortcomings.
At the same time, we know that Norwegian democracy has several serious, structural weaknesses:
Norway also has heavily and directly state-subsidized media, with overwhelming dominance by the public broadcaster NRK, which receives NOK 7.7 billion yet is excluded from official press-subsidy overviews. The trade journal Journalisten reports total media revenues of NOK 28.5 billion in 2023. If we include extensive public-sector purchases of subscriptions and advertising, it is reasonable to estimate that one out of every three Norwegian media kroner is allocated by the national legislature. This creates dominance and market control—also because the fully funded broadcaster NRK competes with commercial actors for sponsorship revenue.
These weaknesses and this media dominance are not details. They are part of an architecture that secures a very strong dominance for politics. Yet these factors appear to reduce Norway’s score by only just under two-tenths from a theoretical maximum. That alone should raise questions.
The index does more than describe democracy. It normalizes it. When a country like Norway is given a score of 9.81, it signals not only that democracy functions well—but that it is, for the most part, fully developed.
Dig just a little deeper, and the shortcomings become striking.
In three areas, the Economist Intelligence Unit concludes that Norway in fact has no room for improvement. “Electoral process and pluralism” receives 10 out of 10 points. Political participation also scores 10 out of 10.
Also, Norwegian political culture scores 10 out of 10. This culture includes the cooperation between the lobbying organization and the trade union LO. Cooperation with the large Labour Party undermines the important independent role of trade unions. Substantial financial contributions secure LO positions within the Labour Party’s central executive committee and nomination committee, and are decisive for the party’s electoral support and governing power. This intermingling is visible in politics and public administration at all levels in Norway, extends into NGOs, and includes support for additional parties on the political left.
Read also: On democratic deficits in Norwegian political party organizations
On a scale from 1 to 10, many Norwegians would probably give a rating of 11 for the overwhelming nature of public exercise of authority. The EIU nevertheless assigns a high score of 9.64. Fundamental rights in a country that loses child-welfare cases before the European Court of Human Rights score 9.41.
For journalists, commentators, and the public, both the overall score and the three perfect 10s out of five possible categories become almost paralyzing. What is left to criticize when an internationally recognized index tool such as The Economist’s Democracy Index tells us that democracy is already among the very best in the world?
Read more: EIU Democracy Index 2024 – Why doesn’t representative democracy work as it should?
The index thus has an unintended effect: it depoliticizes. Critical questions appear petty, exaggerated, or hostile to the system. The numbers become a rhetorical shield against legitimate, structural criticism of democracy. A Norwegian political industry, which has shaped the asymmetrical The Norwegian Fund-Backed Political Dominance Model, can continue to undermine democracy while basking in the glow of the apparent pinnacle of British journalism from The Economist. For yes, it is an intelligence unit with alleged dependencies, but we tend to think of it as the renowned magazine founded in 1843 and wonder whether its journalists have managed to preserve their critical capacity.
The contrast becomes even clearer when we look at how the index describes other democracies. Large, complex, and conflict-ridden societies such as the United States and France are categorized in the Democracy Index 2025 as “flawed democracies,” alongside countries such as Malta, Chile, Slovenia, Israel, South Korea, Latvia, Belgium, Botswana, Lithuania, Italy, Poland, and Cyprus. These are strong words, with strong implications.
But what is actually being measured here? Democratic control and balance of power—or administrative stability, consensus, and institutional calm?
The United States is an unruly democracy—or, more precisely, a constitutional federal republic. Popular sovereignty in the U.S. is conflict-ridden, polarizing, and often chaotic. At the same time, it is a system with strong countervailing powers, independent courts, real dispersion of power, and high capacity for change. A democracy that pushes back when pressured, precisely because it is built for friction. When such qualities are interpreted as weaknesses, while stability without popular control—as in Norway—is rewarded, the Economist Intelligence Unit reveals a normative choice.
When Norwegian newsrooms cite 9.81 as a kind of quality seal, it often happens without the obvious follow-up question: How can the number be so high when fundamental structural issues barely seem to register? What appears as sober factual reference becomes, in practice, a confirmation: “Little reason to challenge those in power beyond cheerful ‘how do you feel now?’ questions. We are almost done.”
And when that confirmation is repeated year after year, it embeds itself in the national self-image. Norway becomes not just “a good democracy,” but a democracy that—according to authoritative measurement—lies so close to the ideal that structural objections can easily be dismissed as exaggerations.
This leads to the most fundamental question: Who is evaluating us—and on what basis? The EIU describes the types of sources it uses—experts, analysts, and assessments from professional environments—but is far less specific about who these assessors actually are in practice. A close reading of the appendix (page 84) of the Democracy Index 2024 contains fine words about defining and measuring democracy, but who actually performs the evaluations remains shrouded in darkness—and objective observations of Norway are clearly beyond those who award three perfect 10s.
Are these people closely connected to public administration, unconsciously affirming systems they themselves are part of? Are they experts who assess democracy primarily as a set of formal institutions rather than as real control over power? Or is it a London-centric perspective, where a “well-functioning democracy” in practice means a society that is stable, predictable, and administratively tidy?
Oagal’s earlier inquiries to the EIU about concrete changes in Norwegian electoral law and the implications of the large volume of legislation shaped by the EU and flowing into Norway without participation by Norwegian politicians have received neither answers nor resulted in any substantive dialogue about the assessment framework.
Read also: A critical look at the EIU Democracy Index
When the EIU Democracy Index 2025 is published soon, the numbers deserve more than routine dissemination. They deserve to be read critically—not least by journalists at The Economist itself, so they are not caught off guard in the same way the BBC recently was.
Readers of the democracy index will need credible editorial work to evaluate the EIU’s work—including the perspectives that are overlooked.
Or perhaps the report should be reviewed by someone with sufficient distance before it is published?
Christian Sømme er Oagals redaktør og demokratiaktivist. Overalt i Norge og internasjonalt møter han mennesker som ikke kan assosiere seg med og føler maktesløshet overfor beslutningene til politikere, offentlig administrasjon og domstoler. Han har etablert Oagal som en uavhengig mediekanal for å dekke disse problemstillingene, oppsummert som «reelt demokrati». Sømme har vært tillitsmann, by- og stedsutviklingsaktivist i en mannsalder, og demokratiaktivist som Medvirkningsombudet (selvutnevnt) fra 2018 og med Oagal fra 2024. (Foto: Thomas Eckhoff)
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