In an article in Arbeiderbladet dated 12 June 1929, which was also reprinted in many other newspapers within the labour press, it appears that the Labour Party put forward a comprehensive proposal for constitutional revision. The point of departure was clear: the Norwegian Constitution had not kept pace with political developments, and there was a need for modernization, clearer balance of power, and stronger constitutional control mechanisms.
Among the proposals was the abolition of the division of the Storting into the Odelsting and the Lagting. The justification was efficiency: legislative processing had become cumbersome and formalistic, without real added value. However, this was not intended as an isolated efficiency measure. On the contrary, it was explicitly assumed that power consolidated in a single chamber would be balanced by a strengthened and independent Court of Impeachment – organized as a genuine constitutional court.
The proposal appears principled. It was not about party politics, but about institutional balance: when one structure is removed, another must be strengthened to preserve democratic equilibrium.
Today, the bicameral system has been abolished. The Storting is unified in a single chamber. But the proposed counterweight was never established as intended.
The Court of Impeachment still exists, but as a hybrid body with both political and judicial elements, and with a role that in practice is very limited. Norway has no separate constitutional court, and constitutional review of legislation and political decisions is weak and restrained.
The decisive point is not whether this was necessarily intended. The decisive point is the effect: an institutional brake was removed, while the presumed counterweight failed to materialize. The result is a system that is more governable, but less resilient to concentrations of power.
The decisive point is not whether this was necessarily intended. The decisive point is the effect: an institutional brake was removed, while the presumed counterweight failed to materialize.
This is not a uniquely Norwegian phenomenon. In democratic research, such processes are described as democratic backsliding: gradual democratic erosion occurring within formally legitimate frameworks, which Oagal has described as the Unjust State, often driven by the pursuit of efficiency, orderliness, or decisiveness.
The defining characteristic is precisely this: reforms that, taken individually, may appear reasonable, but collectively shift the balance of power. Institutions are removed or simplified, while compensation – in the form of strengthened oversight, counterweights, or citizen protection – is postponed, downplayed, or never realized.
Observations of this led, for example, to Oagal’s editor establishing the Participation Ombudsman (self-appointed) as a democratic activist measure against many municipalities’ systematic violations of the Planning and Building Act’s statutory requirements for participation. A strong example of this is the Skøyen case, involving systematic sidelining of residents’ democratic rights by the country’s largest municipality; Norway’s capital, Oslo.
Over time, these shifts in the balance of power accumulate. Each individual measure does not appear as a dramatic breach, but together they constitute a barely visible change in how power is actually exercised, even though the consequences for democracy are substantial.
The Labour Party’s position in 1929 is particularly interesting because it clearly illustrates the difference between intention and outcome. The intention was to modernize democracy without weakening its fundamental safeguards. The result, seen in retrospect, is a system in which governance has been streamlined, while constitutional counterweights have not been correspondingly strengthened.
This illustrates a central point in the analysis of the Unjust State and democratic backsliding: it is entirely possible to act in good faith, with legitimate justifications, and still contribute to structures that over time weaken popular sovereignty.
From Oagal’s perspective, this historical line is not a retrospective reckoning with a party, but an illustration of how democracies are weakened through multiple decisions and events. Each reform may be defensible on its own, but collectively they shift power relations in one direction. Even negative milestones such as the introduction of a closed-list electoral system pass largely unnoticed by the public and the media, which have grown accustomed to the exercise of power.
Once institutional counterweights are removed, they are difficult to re-establish. That is precisely why it is crucial to study not only what is removed, but also what is actually put in its place. The history from 1929 also shows that reforms are necessary, but that they must in fact be fully implemented in order to achieve the necessary balance and, preferably, development in a positive direction.
De fleste av artiklene på Oagal er utarbeidet av redaksjonen. Innholdet fra redaksjonen er det fortløpende redaksjonelle arbeidet i Oagal. Redaksjonen driver undersøkende journalistikk, utvikler ideer til saker og utarbeider artikler ved hjelp av ulike tilgjengelige kilder og verktøy. Meningsbærende innhold og også reportasjer bærer skribentens navn.
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