Norwegian democracy consists of elections to the national parliament, county councils, and municipal councils. The legislative proposal (in PDF format) Prop. 45 L (2022–2023) Act on Elections to the Storting, County Councils, and Municipal Councils (Election Act) covers these levels and other aspects of the election process. Those who wish to read or translate the full proposal can download the document in Word format here.
The Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development, which is one of several politically governed ministries in Norway, justified the removal of all direct voter influence over individual candidates in parliamentary elections by arguing that the previous system misled voters—and that removing it was better than improving it.
The stated rationale was that political parties already had solid internal processes. As the Storting followed the Ministry’s recommendation and passed the proposal, the government thereby sealed Norway’s transition to full party rule. This was briefly mentioned in national media. International media and democracy institutions have not included this shift to party dominance / organizationally representative governance in their assessments of Norwegian democracy.
From page 92 of the government’s proposal:
Based on a holistic assessment, the Ministry believes it is not desirable to give voters influence over which of a party’s candidates are elected. Political parties have a major responsibility to put together electoral lists appropriately, and the Ministry has confidence that parties fulfill this responsibility properly.
As noted above, the Ministry finds it unfortunate that voters have the opportunity to modify ballots when such modifications have no impact. In addition, the current candidate selection system requires significant labor and resources to count personal votes, which do not affect who gets elected. The current system also constrains ballot design. By removing the option to cast personal votes, ballots can be simplified.
This became the Storting’s decision in Legislative Act 96 (2022–2023), adopted on June 6, 2023, sanctioned on June 16, and entered into force on May 1, 2024—effectively applying from the 2025 parliamentary election.
Oagal reproduces the full Chapter 14 of the legislative proposal below. For clarity, we have added “to the national assembly of Norway” to the chapter heading.
Political parties play a fundamental role in Norwegian democracy. They are responsible for identifying and nominating candidates for elected office. This gives parties considerable influence over candidate selection, but through the personal voting system, voters can also gain influence over who is elected. Electoral systems with party lists may feature varying degrees of personal voting, and the lists may be open, semi-open, or closed. Open lists mean that voters’ personal votes determine which candidates are elected. Semi-open lists (as used in Norway) mean that personal votes matter, but thresholds are in place to balance voter influence against party control. Closed lists mean that parties have full control over the ranking of candidates on the ballot. The Election Law Commission has assessed the personal voting system for parliamentary, county, and municipal elections.
The rules for personal voting in parliamentary elections are set out in Section 7-2, first paragraph, of the Election Act. This provision allows voters to alter the order of candidates on the ballot by writing a number next to a candidate’s name. Voters may also strike out candidate names as indicated on the ballot.
The rules for determining which candidates are elected are found in Section 11-5, first paragraph. It states that the county electoral board allocates mandates to candidates once the number of district mandates for a party list has been determined. This is done as follows:
First, the names listed as number 1 on the ballots are counted. On unmodified ballots, the top candidate is considered number 1. The candidate with the most number 1 votes is elected. If the list has more than one mandate, the number 2 positions are then counted. This process continues until all available seats on the list are filled. If several candidates have the same number of votes, their original ranking on the list determines the outcome. This means that over half of a party’s voters in a district must make the same change to the ballot for it to have any effect.
Candidates who are ineligible are disregarded. Substitute representatives are selected in the same way as regular representatives.
Because the threshold for changes to have any effect is so high, voter alterations to the lists have no practical impact. To date, no changes made by voters have ever altered the ranking of a party list that won enough votes to gain seats.
Rules for personal voting in county council elections are provided in Section 7-2, second paragraph, of the Election Act. In these elections, voters may give personal votes to candidates on the list they are voting for. Voters may give one personal vote per candidate, with no limit on the number of candidates who may receive a personal vote from a voter.
Section 11-10, second paragraph, of the Election Act describes how candidates are selected. The county electoral board determines the candidates once the number of mandates for a party list is known. For personal votes to influence the selection, a candidate must receive personal votes from at least eight percent of the voters who supported the list. Personal votes for candidates who do not reach this threshold are disregarded.
Candidates who receive personal votes on at least eight percent of the list’s approved ballots are selected first. If more than one candidate surpasses this threshold, the number of personal votes determines their ranking. Remaining candidates are selected according to the list order. Ineligible candidates are excluded. Substitute representatives are selected in the same way as regular representatives.
In municipal elections, parties may grant a 25 percent vote bonus to a limited number of top-ranked candidates, as per Section 6-2, third paragraph, of the Election Act. The number of candidates eligible for such a bonus depends on the size of the municipal council:
Candidates granted this bonus must appear first on the party list and in bold text.
As in county elections, voters may give personal votes to candidates on the list they support (Section 7-2, second paragraph). Each voter may give one personal vote per candidate, with no limit on how many candidates may receive votes.
Voters may also give personal votes to candidates from other lists (known as cross-party voting), under Section 7-2, third paragraph. The number of candidates that can be selected from other lists depends on the size of the council. Voters may list up to one-fourth of the total council size from other lists, with a minimum of five candidates always allowed. Each candidate can receive only one personal vote. When a voter gives a personal vote to a candidate on another list, a corresponding number of list votes is transferred to that list. Only personal votes for eligible candidates on other lists are counted.
These personal votes are given by writing the names of candidates from other lists directly on the ballot. If needed for identification, the party name must also be written.
In the final count, the electoral board records the voter’s alterations on the ballots (Section 10-6, third paragraph). The board converts the votes into list votes and calculates the total for each party. Each ballot counts for as many list votes as there are seats to be filled. This total is adjusted for personal votes cast for and received from other lists.
After mandates are allocated to each party list, the candidates are selected. The total of party bonuses, personal votes from the party’s list, and personal votes from other parties (cross-party votes) is used to allocate seats to candidates, per Section 11-12, second paragraph, of the Election Act.
Candidates who received a party bonus are first awarded that bonus according to Section 6-2, third paragraph. For such candidates, the number of list votes is multiplied by 1.25 before any personal votes are added. For candidates without a party bonus, the total is the sum of list votes and personal votes. The total constitutes the candidate’s personal score, and candidates are selected in order of this score.
If multiple candidates receive the same number of personal votes, their position on the list determines the ranking. Ineligible candidates are excluded from both list vote and candidate selection calculations. Cross-party votes for ineligible candidates are disregarded. Substitute representatives are selected in the same way as regular representatives.
The rules for individual candidate selection in parliamentary elections are set out in section 7-2, first paragraph, of the Election Act. This provision allows voters in parliamentary elections to change the order in which the candidates are listed on the ballot. This is done by writing a number next to the candidate’s name. The voter may also strike out candidate names by proceeding as indicated on the ballot.
The rules for the allocation of seats to candidates follow from section 11-5, first paragraph, of the Election Act. This provision states that the county election committee allocates mandates to the candidates on the list once it has been determined how many district mandates an electoral list is to receive. This is done in the following way:
First, the names listed as number 1 on the ballots are counted. On uncorrected ballots, the top candidate is number 1. The candidate with the highest number of listings is elected. If the list is to receive more than one mandate, the names listed as number 2 on the ballots are then counted. The count continues in the same way until all the representative seats the list is to receive have been allocated. If several candidates achieve the same result, the original position on the list is decisive. This means that more than half of a party’s voters in an electoral district must make the same change on the ballot for it to have any effect.
Candidates who are not eligible for election are disregarded. Substitute representatives are selected in the same manner as representatives.
Because the threshold for corrections to have an effect is so high, voters’ corrections to the lists in practice have no impact. To date, it has never happened that voters’ changes have altered the order of a list that has obtained enough votes to elect representatives.
The rules for individual candidate selection in county council elections are set out in section 7-2, second paragraph, of the Election Act. In county council elections, voters may cast personal votes for candidates on the list they vote for. Voters may give one personal vote per candidate, and there is no limit to how many candidates may receive a personal vote from a voter.
Section 11-10, second paragraph, of the Election Act describes how the allocation of seats to candidates is to take place. The allocation is carried out by the county election committee once it has been determined how many mandates an electoral list is to receive. For the personal votes to have an effect in the allocation, a candidate must have received personal votes from at least eight percent of the voters who have voted for the list. Personal votes cast for candidates who do not receive personal votes from a sufficient number of voters are disregarded.
This means that the candidates who have received personal votes from at least eight percent of the approved ballots for the electoral list are selected first. If several candidates exceed this threshold, the number of personal votes determines the ranking. The remaining candidates are selected according to the order on the list. Candidates who are not eligible for election are disregarded. Substitute representatives are selected in the same manner as representatives.
In municipal council elections, parties may grant a vote bonus amounting to 25 percent of the votes to a limited number of the top candidates, cf. section 6-2, third paragraph, of the Election Act. The number of candidates who may be granted such a vote bonus depends on how many municipal council members are to be elected:
Candidates who are granted a vote bonus by the party are indicated by being listed first on the list proposal and in bold type.
Voters may, in the same way as in county council elections, cast a personal vote for candidates on the list they vote for, cf. section 7-2, second paragraph, of the Election Act. They may give one personal vote per candidate, and there is no limit to how many candidates may receive a personal vote from a voter.
In municipal council elections, voters may also cast a personal vote for one or more candidates on other lists, so-called panachage, cf. section 7-2, third paragraph, of the Election Act. The number of candidates that may be entered from other lists depends on how many members are to be elected to the municipal council. At most, as many candidates may be entered as corresponds to one quarter of the number of members to be elected. Regardless of the number of members to be elected, it is nevertheless always permitted to enter a minimum of five candidates from other lists. Only one personal vote may be given per candidate. When the voter casts a personal vote for candidates on other lists, a corresponding number of list votes is transferred to the list or lists on which those candidates are listed. Only personal votes for eligible candidates on other lists are counted.
Voters give this type of personal vote by entering the names of candidates from other lists on the ballot. If it is necessary to identify the candidate, the party name must also be entered.
In the final count of ballots for the municipal council election, the election committee registers the corrections voters have made to the ballots, cf. section 10-6, third paragraph, of the Election Act. The election committee recalculates the votes into list votes and determines the list vote totals for each list. Each ballot counts as many list votes as there are members to be elected to the municipal council. The number is adjusted for the personal votes cast for other lists and for personal votes received from other lists.
After the allocation of mandates among the various lists has been carried out, the allocation of seats to candidates takes place. The sum of the parties’ vote bonuses, personal votes on the parties’ lists, and personal votes from other parties’ lists (panachage) is used to allocate the representative seats to the candidates on the list, cf. section 11-12, second paragraph, of the Election Act.
Candidates who have been granted a vote bonus by the party are first given the vote bonus to which they are entitled pursuant to section 6-2, third paragraph. For candidates with a vote bonus, the list vote total is multiplied by 1.25 before any personal votes are added. For candidates who have not received a vote bonus, the starting point is the list vote total plus any personal votes. The sum of this becomes the candidate’s personal votes, and the candidates are ranked in order accordingly.
If several candidates have received the same number of personal votes, the order on the list is decisive. Candidates who are not eligible for election are disregarded. This applies both in the allocation of list votes and in the allocation of seats to candidates for each individual party. This means that if a candidate who is not eligible for election has received panachage votes from voters of other parties, those panachage votes are to be disregarded. Substitute representatives are selected in the same manner as representatives.
The committee discusses the individual candidate selection systems for parliamentary elections, county council elections, and municipal council elections, and considers various consequences of a stronger element of individual candidate selection in the electoral system. The committee believes there should be as much consistency as possible between the different systems used in the various elections, and that the current municipal council election system should be the point of departure for the individual candidate selection systems.
The committee points out that a stronger element of individual candidate selection will increase voters’ influence over who is elected. Under the current system, small groups of politically active individuals in each electoral district determine who is elected to the Storting from each party. This is done through the parties’ nomination meetings, in which very few of the voters participate. Also in municipal and county council elections, the parties’ ranking of candidates and any vote bonuses are to a large extent decisive for who is elected.
The committee has reviewed the historical development of individual candidate selection and points out that the system has been problematized in repeated public inquiries since the current system was introduced in 1920. The individual candidate selection system has been considered several times by the Storting without a majority being achieved for a specific system.
The previous Election Law Commission proposed in NOU 2001: 3 to introduce a system with a moderate element of individual candidate selection in parliamentary elections, corresponding to the system introduced for county council elections, but with a threshold of 5 percent. The previous commission also proposed to remove panachage and the possibility to strike out candidates in municipal council elections. The Storting subsequently adopted the introduction of individual candidate selection in county council elections, but with a threshold of 8 percent. The possibility to strike out candidates in municipal council elections was also adopted, while panachage was retained. Individual candidate selection was not introduced in parliamentary elections.
In 2016, the Storting adopted a request resolution in which the government was asked to return to the Storting with a proposal for an individual candidate selection system in which two new systems were to be considered. A private member’s bill in the same year led to a request resolution to “reintroduce the voter’s opportunity to strike out list candidates.” The committee has therefore examined the two systems and discussed strike-outs as part of its assessment.
The committee believes that the current parliamentary election system, in which voters may change the order of the candidates even though the lists are in reality closed, is problematic because voters may be misled into believing that they influence the candidate selection. The committee also points out that Norway has been criticized by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) for this system. In its election observation report from the 2017 parliamentary election, the OSCE recommended a reconsideration of the high threshold for changing which candidates are elected. Alternatively, the OSCE believes that the system should be removed to avoid giving voters the impression of an influence they do not in practice have. The committee therefore believes that there should either be completely closed lists, or that individual candidate selection must be expanded so that there is a real opportunity to influence who is elected to the Storting. This is supported by the entire committee.
The majority of the committee (all except one member) believes that individual candidate selection should be expanded in parliamentary elections and that a system with weak individual candidate selection should be introduced. These members believe that it is a positive expansion of democracy to give voters the opportunity to influence who their representatives to the Storting will be. The majority of the committee does not see an increased focus on individuals as a major problem and does not believe that a limited element of individual candidate selection will affect the role of the parties. The parties’ role in recruiting, developing, and nominating candidates is very important for democracy. A solution with weak individual candidate selection safeguards this, while at the same time giving voters the opportunity to express their preferences.
These members believe that the municipal council election model would be the best system to introduce in parliamentary elections. This is a system in which parties may in advance grant a vote bonus to a certain number of candidates. Candidates with a vote bonus receive an addition to their personal vote total corresponding to 25 percent of the number of ballots the list has received. Voters may cast a personal vote for as many candidates as they wish. For a candidate who has not received a vote bonus to be ranked ahead of a candidate with a vote bonus, it would require that more than 25 percent of the voters cast a personal vote for that candidate.
The individual candidate selection system used in municipal council elections has a long tradition in Norway and is well known among voters. These members emphasize that the parties retain a large degree of control over how much influence voters have over individual candidate selection, while the system gives voters greater influence than today. The municipal council election system gives parties the opportunity to decide for themselves how much influence they wish to give voters. The system is also known to voters and allows parties to adapt to how the system functions over time. These members believe that there should be no limitation on how many candidates may receive a vote bonus in parliamentary and county council elections.
With regard to the threshold, the majority of the committee (13 members) believes that it is not necessary to also introduce a threshold that regulates when voters’ corrections are to have an effect. The system the committee supports ensures that the parties’ design of the lists carries great weight, and a threshold reduces the parties’ ability to allow voters to decide for themselves. A threshold also primarily has consequences for large parties and will probably not affect the lists of the smallest parties. These members believe that this makes the threshold a poorly suited instrument, and with vote bonuses the parties’ lists will already carry great weight.
The minority of the committee (3 members) believes that the vote bonus is not sufficient to prevent very small groups from gaining too much influence. The parties must take many considerations into account to ensure necessary breadth and representation when nominating their candidates. These members believe that it is important that the parties are ensured influence over individual candidate selection in order to best fulfill this responsibility. These members therefore believe that a threshold of eight percent for individual candidate selection in parliamentary elections is necessary, in addition to the possibility of granting vote bonuses.
One member of the committee instead wishes to introduce an individual candidate selection system based on ranking. The member believes that the proposed vote bonus in the municipal council election model is not sufficient to prevent small groups from gaining a disproportionately large influence over who is elected. The member believes that the ranking model ensures that a candidate who is elected ahead of candidates who are listed above them has a reasonable amount of support.
Another member of the committee believes that a system with closed lists and candidate selection carried out by the parties safeguards citizens’ democratic rights in a good way. This member views the parties’ nomination processes as important democratic workshops at the local level. The nomination processes can take social and geographical representation into account in a way that is not possible with individual candidate selection. The fact that the proportion of citizens who are party members is declining is seen by this member as an argument against further reducing the importance of the parties. Removing one of the parties’ central functions could reinforce the current development toward a reduction in the parties’ importance. By participating in political parties, one can contribute and influence individual candidate selection. The parties should also be encouraged to open up the nomination processes and get more people to participate in this work. This member is also concerned about an increase in the focus on individuals that may come as a consequence of expanded individual candidate selection. This member believes that the current theoretical individual candidate selection must be abolished and will introduce completely closed lists in parliamentary elections. Subsidiarily, this member supports the municipal council election system with an eight percent threshold.
If an individual candidate selection system is introduced in parliamentary elections, the committee believes that the financing of personal election campaigns for individual candidates must be regulated. The committee believes that this is an issue that the ministry must examine more closely on the basis of international standards.
The committee believes that personal votes should continue to be part of county council elections, and that a system similar to the current municipal council election system should be introduced, but without limitations on the number of candidates that may receive a vote bonus from the parties. Introducing the municipal council system in county council elections will simplify the election system so that these elections become more alike. Since municipal and county council elections are held simultaneously, this supports the case for the systems being as similar as possible. This will make it easier for voters to understand the electoral system and may lead to greater voter participation in personal voting. The committee does not believe it is necessary to have any threshold for personal votes in county council elections.
The committee has also considered whether the system of allowing voters to give panachage votes to candidates on other lists should be introduced in county council elections. The majority of the committee (13 members) does not wish to introduce panachage in county council elections. These members point out that this would make election implementation and vote counting much more complicated and would add complexity for voters. Voters also generally have less familiarity with county politicians, and there is no tradition of panachage in county council elections.
The minority of the committee (5 members) believes in principle that voters should be able to give panachage votes also in county council elections. This would make county and municipal council elections more similar for the voter. This is practical since the elections are held at the same time. The arguments in favor of panachage in municipal council elections—for example, that they promote a culture of consensus—also apply to county council elections.
Personal Vote System
The committee believes that the current municipal council election system works well and should not be changed. Regarding vote bonuses, the committee does not believe it is necessary either to increase the bonus amount or to change the number of candidates who may be granted a vote bonus. The current system, with a limited number of candidates eligible for a vote bonus, strikes a good balance between the influence of parties and voters.
Panachage Votes
The committee is divided on the issue of panachage votes. The majority of the committee (14 members) believes that the system of panachage contributes positively to the election system. These members emphasize that the system gives voters the opportunity both to support multiple parties simultaneously and to choose the best candidates regardless of party affiliation. These members also believe that the system supports the consensus culture in Norwegian politics and acts as a counterbalance to polarization and conflict by allowing voters to support candidates across party lines.
A minority of four members wishes to abolish the panachage system. These members point out that voters already have significant influence over which candidates are elected in municipal council elections, in addition to the vote they cast for the list as a whole. The panachage system gives voters influence over which candidates are elected from other lists than the one they voted for. The members note that the purpose of giving panachage votes may partly be to strengthen representation of a specific district or demographic group, or that the selection of candidates from another list could benefit the interests of the voter’s own list. This may particularly allow larger lists to influence which candidates represent a smaller list. The members emphasize that giving panachage votes reduces the number of list votes for one’s own party by the same number of votes as are given to other lists. This can affect not only which candidates are elected from the other list, but also the number of mandates won by the voter’s own list. There are examples where very few panachage votes have determined the allocation of mandates.
The members point out that the system requires a high level of voter knowledge, and that many voters are probably unaware that their panachage votes weaken their own list’s chances of gaining mandates. It is also very difficult to predict the effect of an individual voter’s panachage votes. The members also note that the system complicates the final election count, which goes against a general desire for simpler and more understandable rules. These members also emphasize that having the same election system for all three types of elections would be beneficial. Finally, these members argue that it may be democratically problematic for voters from one party to influence both the personal selection and the mandate chances of another party.
The committee has considered whether the desire for uniform systems across the various elections should impact the municipal council election system. This could have meant removing the panachage system. However, the committee does not find it necessary to change the municipal council election system, as panachage is most relevant at the local level. The committee concludes that municipal council elections are more candidate-oriented than other Norwegian elections, and that the panachage system has a long tradition and is well established.
Strikethroughs
The committee is also divided on the question of strikethroughs in municipal council elections. The majority of the committee (12 members) does not wish to reintroduce strikethroughs. These members believe strikethroughs send an unfortunate signal to those who make themselves available as candidates. The majority notes that it is uncommon internationally to allow expression of both positive and negative preferences. Strikethroughs also complicate personal voting for voters and election authorities. Reintroducing strikethroughs would also make it easier to carry out voter campaigns and give even greater influence to those voters who understand the system than the current system already does.
The minority of the committee (6 members) wishes to reintroduce strikethroughs. They believe that it is positive for voters to have the opportunity to correct the lists if they dislike the candidates presented. These members want to give voters more influence and therefore do not believe it is necessary to simultaneously increase the vote bonus amount.
A total of 27 consulted bodies have provided comments on the personal voting system. Some comment only on personal voting in relation to parliamentary, county council, or municipal elections, while others provide feedback on multiple systems.
The Norwegian Directorate of Elections comments on the administrative consequences of personal voting systems for vote counting, as well as the potential confusion different systems may create for voters. The Directorate therefore agrees with the committee’s assessment that there should either be a real personal voting system for parliamentary elections or closed lists. The Directorate also agrees that three different personal voting systems may confuse voters and that the current parliamentary election system is problematic because voters may believe they influence candidate selection. If there is to be a personal voting system in parliamentary elections, the Directorate agrees that the municipal council model is a good alternative.
Several bodies, including Drammen Municipality, Eigersund Municipality, The Council for the Elderly in Nesodden Municipality, and Senior Norway are positive toward the committee’s aim to harmonize personal voting across the different election systems. Eigersund Municipality points out that harmonizing the systems would make things easier for voters and election staff inside and outside polling stations.
Vefsn Municipality believes it is important to have as similar rules as possible for voters and to ensure that voters have real influence over who is elected to the county councils and the Parliament. Trondheim Municipality agrees and writes that it is a major advantage for the three elections to have as similar systems as possible.
Thirteen consulted bodies support the committee majority’s proposal to introduce the municipal council model, thereby implementing weak personal voting in parliamentary elections.
Eigersund Municipality notes that a personal voting system with such a high threshold that it is practically ineffective is very detrimental to the legitimacy of the election system.
The Council for the Elderly in Nesodden Municipality, Hammerfest Municipality, and Senior Norway support the committee’s rationale that introducing the municipal council model for parliamentary elections would give voters more influence. These bodies also believe that the system preserves the influence of parties. Senior Norway writes:
In this way, the individual voter can to some degree influence who gets elected. At the same time, Senior Norway would like to point out that the parties still have very strong influence over who gets elected, even with a personal voting method. The nomination process still largely determines the outcome for each candidate.
Eight consulted bodies do not support the committee majority’s proposal to expand personal voting in parliamentary elections. Several bodies, including Innlandet County Council, Stavanger Municipality, and Akershus Centre Party, argue that diversity and geographic representation are best ensured through the parties’ nomination processes. Akershus Centre Party writes:
Parties spend a long time anchoring parliamentary lists among their members. The list is carefully composed based on geographic, age, and gender distribution, as well as individuals with varied professional and social backgrounds. This is also done in municipal elections, but we too often see that women and people with immigrant backgrounds end up lower on the lists, as others are moved up. If real personal voting is introduced in parliamentary elections, we fear that the diverse composition of the Parliament may be skewed. Candidates high on the list usually invest more effort and resources. Introducing real personal voting could challenge this and make it harder for parties to plan campaigns.
Stavanger Municipality supports the committee member who believes that candidate selection should be handled by parties, and that lists should be closed. Stavanger is the only body that comments that the current system should be abolished:
Stavanger supports the committee member who believes that closed lists and candidate selection by parties safeguard citizens’ democratic rights effectively. Therefore, it is logical to abolish the personal voting system, which today is more theoretical than real.
Namsos Municipality believes the proposal may favor urban areas and therefore wishes to maintain the current system. Tolga Municipality also points out that the proposal would reduce intra-party democracy. Trøndelag County Council expresses concern that the proposed system would lead to increased focus on individuals:
Trøndelag County Council sees that this could have negative consequences, especially regarding geography, gender, and “celebrity factor.” Candidates from densely populated areas may get more personal votes and disrupt the lists at the expense of sparsely populated areas. Increased personal focus and social media campaigning may weaken the overall balance that is ensured by the parties’ nomination processes, allowing a small minority of list voters to change the ranking.
Three consulted bodies support the majority’s proposal not to introduce a vote threshold. These are Bergen Municipality, Drammen Municipality, and Hammerfest Municipality. Other supportive bodies did not comment specifically on the threshold. Drammen Municipality writes:
There are no restrictions on how many candidates may be granted vote bonuses. Therefore, there is no need for a vote threshold.
The committee did not discuss introducing panachage in parliamentary elections. However, two consulted bodies commented on this. The Central Youth Council in Oslo wishes to introduce panachage. Viken County Council states that they do not wish to introduce panachage for parliamentary elections.
Viken County Council also supports the committee’s proposal that personal campaign financing for individual candidates must be regulated if real personal voting is introduced for the Parliament.
Twelve consulted bodies support the committee majority’s proposal to introduce an expanded personal voting system in county council elections, similar to the municipal council model. Among them are Troms and Finnmark County Council and Viken County Council.
Five bodies express support for the model also including vote bonuses from parties, as proposed by the committee majority. These are Askøy Municipality, Hammerfest Municipality, Troms and Finnmark County Council, Viken County Council, and KS. Hammerfest Municipality writes:
Hammerfest Municipality also supports the majority’s assessment that personal voting should continue for county council elections, and that a system similar to the municipal council election should be introduced, but without limits on the number of candidates who can receive vote bonuses from parties.
KS writes:
KS supports the majority’s proposal to apply the current municipal personal voting system to county council elections, including the possibility for parties to grant vote bonuses (pre-cumulation).
Seven consulted bodies disagree with the majority’s proposal to expand personal voting in county council elections, including Innlandet County Council, Vestfold and Telemark County Council, and Vestland County Council. Innlandet County Council writes:
The personal voting system used in municipal elections should not be applied to parliamentary and county elections, because diversity and geographic representation are best safeguarded through party nomination processes. Increased focus on individuals may benefit urban areas but traditionally comes at the expense of women, immigrants, and other groups who have historically received fewer personal votes.
Four consulted bodies, Akershus Centre Party, Gjerstad Municipality, Troms and Finnmark County Council, and Viken County Council, support the committee majority’s proposal not to introduce panachage in county council elections. Viken County Council writes:
Viken County Council agrees that there should be no restriction on how many candidates can receive vote bonuses and does not support the introduction of panachage in county and parliamentary elections.
Three consulted bodies, Askøy Municipality, Eigersund Municipality, and KS, support the committee minority’s proposal to introduce panachage in county council elections. KS believes that the proposed changes overall represent a further expansion of democracy. Eigersund Municipality believes that the system is widely used in municipal elections and increases voter influence. Eigersund Municipality writes:
For the same reason, we also support the minority’s proposal that the panachage system should be introduced in county council elections. We see from municipal elections that this option is widely used by voters and will enhance voter influence, which is viewed positively. It is also advantageous to have similar rules for elections that are held simultaneously.
Few consultation statements address the electoral system for municipal council elections.
Tana Municipality and Vaksdal Municipality both state that they do not want any changes to the current municipal election system.
Four entities support the committee majority’s proposal not to reintroduce the option of striking out candidates. These are Drammen Municipality, Eigersund Municipality, Fredrikstad Municipality, and Råde Municipality. Additionally, there are municipalities that prefer the three electoral systems to be as similar as possible or do not want any changes, even though they do not specifically mention striking. Drammen Municipality writes:
The voter’s ability to make their own adjustments on the ballot is already addressed through the current system of personal voting. Drammen Municipality sees no need to reintroduce the option of striking out candidates.
Fredrikstad Municipality writes:
Fredrikstad Municipality supports the committee majority’s position not to reintroduce striking out candidates in municipal council elections. Striking sends an unfortunate signal to those who make themselves available as candidates and complicates personal voting for both voters and election authorities. Reintroducing the option to strike makes it easier to organize voter campaigns and gives even greater influence to those voters who understand the system than the current system does.
Gjerstad Municipality states that they support the committee majority’s proposal to maintain the current system of cross-party voting (slengerstemmer) in municipal elections.
The Ministry would first emphasize that personal voting systems have been thoroughly studied over the past decades and sees no need for further inquiries to decide whether to implement real personal voting. In the Ministry’s view, the decisive question is whether voters should have influence over who is elected to Parliament, or whether this is best managed by the parties.
The Ministry supports the committee’s conclusion that there should either be fully closed lists in parliamentary elections or that voters must be given greater influence over who is elected to Parliament. The Ministry considers it a fundamental issue that voters are currently allowed to make changes to the ballot that, in practice, have no effect.
The Ministry has carefully considered whether voters should be able to influence which individuals are elected to Parliament. This could be seen as an expansion of democracy, but on the other hand, it could also lead to more focus on individuals. The Ministry emphasizes the essential role of political parties in our democracy. For voters, party programs help clarify the political choices.
The Ministry further notes that parties conduct open and thorough nomination processes that take into account various factors such as gender, profession, age, background, and geography. These are important considerations that are hard to maintain in the same way if voters can override party preferences.
Based on a comprehensive assessment, the Ministry believes it is not desirable to give voters influence over which party candidates are elected. Political parties have a major responsibility in assembling candidate lists properly, and the Ministry has confidence that parties fulfill this responsibility well.
As noted above, the Ministry finds it problematic that voters have the option to amend the ballots in a way that has no real effect. Additionally, the current personal voting system demands significant resources for counting votes that do not impact the election outcome. The current system also limits how ballots can be designed. Removing the option for personal voting could simplify the ballot design.
The Ministry points out that the entire Election Law Commission agreed that the current system should either be abolished or expanded. In line with this, the Ministry proposes abolishing the personal voting system for parliamentary elections. However, the Ministry believes that all candidate names should still appear on the ballot so that voters can see who the party has nominated.
The Ministry agrees with the committee that the electoral system would be simplified if the municipal council election model were also used for county council elections. Since the two elections are held simultaneously, aligning them would be beneficial for the practical execution. It would also make it easier to inform voters about their options for casting personal votes in these elections. However, the Ministry believes this does not justify changing the current system for county council elections. The Ministry finds that the existing system works well and that the balance between voter and party influence is appropriate. Therefore, the Ministry proposes maintaining the current personal voting system for county council elections.
Personal Voting System
The Ministry agrees with the committee that the current personal voting system for municipal council elections works well. Like the committee, the Ministry intends to maintain the current limitation on how many candidates can receive additional votes in municipal council elections. In municipal council elections, there is a closer relationship between voters and representatives. The Ministry believes this supports giving voters greater influence over personal selection in municipal council elections compared to county and parliamentary elections, as is currently the case.
Cross-Party Votes (Slengerstemmer)
The Ministry notes that the cross-party vote system in municipal council elections has been debated numerous times, with several proposals to remove, modify, or reintroduce the system.
The Ministry points out that the system allows voters to influence which candidates are elected to the municipal councils, regardless of which party they vote for. The committee highlighted that the system supports a consensus-oriented understanding of politics. The system has been criticized for allowing voters to influence candidate selection on lists other than the one they voted for and for being complex and difficult to understand. The Ministry believes it is beneficial for voters to be able to choose both the party and the candidates they find best, and proposes to retain the option of cross-party voting.
The committee also noted that the cross-party vote system can be difficult to understand, easily misunderstood, and complicates vote counting. The Ministry acknowledges the concern about whether voters who cast a cross-party vote have sufficient knowledge to understand that they are simultaneously transferring part of their vote to another list. The Ministry will therefore consider ways to improve voter education about cross-party votes in municipal council elections.
The Ministry proposes a change in the rules regarding the effect of casting a cross-party vote for a non-eligible candidate. Under the current rules, such votes are disregarded and do not affect the distribution of seats between parties. In practice, this rule is very difficult to implement.
In light of this, and proposed changes to eligibility criteria, the Ministry proposes removing this exception. The Ministry assumes that new eligibility rules will result in fewer non-eligible candidates running for office. Additionally, some candidates lose eligibility before the municipal council is constituted—for example, by moving out of the municipality or passing away. Loss of eligibility after the election result has been finalized does not affect the allocation of seats between party lists. The Ministry also considers it very unlikely that this rule can be abused. Removing the exception would greatly simplify the rules and the vote-counting process.
Striking Candidates
The Ministry notes that the option to strike candidates in municipal council elections was previously available, but was removed by the Storting in 2002 following a recommendation from the previous election law committee in NOU 2001: 3. That committee weighed the voter’s right to express negative preferences against the concern for individual candidates and concluded that positive voter preferences should determine who gets elected.
The Ministry supports the majority of the current committee and does not wish to reintroduce the option to strike candidates in municipal council elections. The Ministry shares the committee’s view that positive voter preferences should carry the most weight. It also agrees that striking sends a negative signal to individuals who put themselves forward as candidates and can be a strain on those targeted. The Ministry notes that research shows the candidates who receive the most personal votes are also those most frequently struck. Nevertheless, the Ministry believes that striking would introduce a negative element into the election system. Furthermore, the Ministry emphasizes that allowing both personal votes and the striking of candidates would make it very difficult to design a clear and user-friendly ballot. In the Ministry’s view, combining personal votes and striking would increase the risk of voter errors on the ballot.
De fleste av artiklene på Oagal er utarbeidet av redaksjonen. Innholdet fra redaksjonen er det fortløpende redaksjonelle arbeidet i Oagal. Redaksjonen driver undersøkende journalistikk, utvikler ideer til saker og utarbeider artikler ved hjelp av ulike tilgjengelige kilder og verktøy. Meningsbærende innhold og også reportasjer bærer skribentens navn.
0 Comments